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NOTES
tion should be made, and that it is only when there has been
a clear abuse of that discretion that this court will interfere,
and, even then, only when it is shown that the abuse of that
discretion will result in irreparable injury to the complaining
party."'4 The Supreme Court's failure to overrule specifically
the Marston case raises questions as to its use in the future.
The Marston and Roumain cases may be distinguished in two
important respects. First, as the opinion in the Roumain case
states, the plaintiff had on two occasions caused a stay of trial
proceedings by applying for supervisory writs. The employment
of purely dilatory tactics was obvious. Second, the Marston
case involved a ruling made by the trial judge before trial,
whereas in the Roumain case the ruling was made during the
the trial. It is submitted that the holding of the Roumain case
should not be restricted to its peculiar facts, but should be
interpreted so as to prevent the use of the Marston rule for
delaying the proceedings, either before or after commencement
of trial. The trial judge is in the best position to control the
proceedings in his court and his discretion should be left unfet-
tered unless clearly abused.
Neilson Jacobs
MINERAL RIGHTS-REVERSIONARY INTEREST
Plaintiffs appealed from a judgment dismissing their suit to
be recognized as owners of a one-fourth mineral interest to
which they had purchased the right of reversion. Plaintiffs'
vendor had purchased the surface of the land concerned subject
to an outstanding one-fourth mineral servitude; he then sold the
land, plus a one-half interest in the minerals, to the defendant,
reserving in the act of sale a present one-fourth mineral interest
and the right of reversion to the outstanding servitude. The
act of sale contained the stipulation that the right of reversion
should prescribe at the same time as the one-fourth mineral
interest reserved with it. Plaintiffs alleged that prescription had
run against the outstanding servitude, causing it to vest in them
as purchasers of the right of reversion. Defendants argued that
it reverted to the land which they now own. Held, the reserva-
tion of the reversionary interest was an attempt to circumvent
the public policy of the state that mineral rights should revert
4. 72 So.2d 473 (1954).
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to the land in ten years for nonuser. The stipulation concerning
the prescription of the reversionary interest was of no effect.
Hicks v. Clark, 225 La. 133, 72 So.2d 322 (1954).
The court has in the past recognized by implication a rever-
sionary interest in minerals by stating that it is a "certain
object" which can be legally sold;' that the ten-year liberative
prescription should run from the moment the reversionary in-
terest was sold;2 and that the sale of the reversionary interest
might be handled as the sale of a hope.3 However, it also stated
that a person could not reserve reversionary rights to minerals
which he did not own at the time of the reservation. 4 In none
of these cases did the court find a reversionary interest at issue.
This was recognized by the court in the instant case when it
stated: "The question of whether a landowner who has mineral
servitudes outstanding against his estate can sell the land and
reserve the reversionary rights, or as the owner sell to another
the reversionary rights ... is squarely presented ... for the first
time in this case."5
In the decision before us the court rejected the argument
that the right of reversion could be sold as a hope, declaring
that to enforce such a sale would possibly allow the existence
of a mineral interest beyond ten years without user, "contrary
1. Gailey v. McFarlain, 194 La. 150, 193 So. 570 (1940). For a discussion
and analysis of "reversionary interests," see DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN Lou-
ISIANA 134, § 25 (rev. ed. 1949); Nabors, The Louisiana Mineral Servitude
and Royalty Doctrines: A Report to the Mineral Law Committee of the
Louisiana State Law Institute, 25 TULANE L. REV. 155, 182 (1951).
2. Hodges v. Norton, 200 La. 614, 8 So.2d 618 (1942); McDonald v. Richard,
203 La. 155, 13 So.2d 712 (1943).
3. Arts. 2450, 2451, LA. CIvIL CODE of 1870; Galley v. McFarlain, 194 La.
150, 193 So. 570 (1940).
4. Liberty Farms v. Miller, 216 La. 1023, 45 So.2d 610 (1950). This case
was interpreted as being the court's rejection of the reservation of a re-
versionary interest. See Professor Daggett's discussion in The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1949-1950 Term-Mineral Rights, 11 Lou-
ISIANA LAW REVIEW 158 (1951); and Nabors, The Louisiana Mineral Servitude
and Royalty Doctrines: A Report to the Mineral Law Committee of the
Louisiana State Law Institute, 25 TULANE L. REV. 155, 182 (1951).
5. Hicks v. Clark, 225 La. 133, 72 So.2d 322, 324 (1954). That a reversion-
ary interest was not at issue in the cases is apparent from the court's dis-
position of them. In Gailey v. McFarlain, 194 La. 150, 155, 193 So. 570, 572
(1940), the court held that an act of sale purporting to convey "the right,
title, interest and ownership of the vendor . .. in and to all metals and min-
erals and metal and mineral rights whatsoever" was not a sale or grant
of a reversionary interest. In Hodges v. Norton, 200 La. 614, 8 So.2d 618
(1942), the court found there was no intention to convey a reversionary right
even though the deed was to "convey ... entire reversionary right." Similar
dispositions were made of McDonald v. Richard, 203 La. 155, 13 So.2d 712
(1943) and Gulf Refining Co. v. Orr, 207 La. 915, 22 So.2d 269 (1945). See
Comment, The Reversionary Mineral Interest, 20 TULANE L. REV. 259 (1945).
[VOL. XV
to the public policy of this state that the right to explore for
oil, gas, and other minerals in the absence of use reverts to the
land in a period of 10 years."' 6 It pointed out that under the
provisions of Article 7091 of the Civil Code a servitude contrary
to the public order could not be recognized. It further stated
that when the outstanding servitude prescribed, the lands there-
under were relieved of that burden.8
According to the plaintiffs' brief on application for rehearing,
"The reservation [of the reversionary interest] was written ...
precisely in accordance with the interpretation of the law and
the public policy of this state as interpreted in the three cases
above referred to."9 Other similar agreements probably have
been made in reliance on the cases discussing the merchant-
ability of a reversionary interest. The instant case leaves little
doubt that such agreements will not be enforced by the courts.
Although the major part of the opinion is directed against,
the theory that the reversionary interest can be sold as a hope,
the scope of the court's language is broad enough to be inter-
preted as an implicit rejection of the concept of a reversionary
interest in minerals. It is submitted that a reversionary interest
has no place in Louisiana mineral law. As the court pointed out,
a sale of mineral rights to land creates a servitude upon the
land. The mineral interest therefore cannot revert to a specific
person because the expiration of a servitude does no more than
6. Hicks v. Clark, 225 La. 133, 72 So.2d 322, 325 (1954).
7. Art. 709, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870: "Owners have a right to establish on
their estates, or in favor of their estates, such servitudes as they deem
proper; provided, nevertheless, that the services be not imposed on the
person or in favor of the person, but only on an estate or in favor of an
estate; and provided, moreover, that such services imply nothing contrary
to public order.
"The use and extent of servitudes thus established are regulated by
the title by which they are granted, and if there be no titles, by the follow-
ing rules."
8. Justice Hawthorne in his opinion gives expression to the basic prin-
ciple of civil law that the extinction of a servitude only removes a burden
from the land. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITIL PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN-
gAIS no 352 (2d ed. 1952) and SOHM, THE INSTITUTES. A TEXTBOOK OF THE
HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 309 (3d ed. 1907), who refers to
this principle as "what is sometimes described as 'elasticity' of ownership."
To allow the servitude to be possessed by one other than the landowner by
enforcing the transfer of a reversionary interest would violate both this prin-
ciple and the principle expressed In Art. 709 of the Civil Code, that only
the landowner can create a servitude upon his land.
9. Brief for Appellants on Application for Rehearing, p. 6, Hicks v.
Clark, 225 La. 133, 72 So. 322 (1954). The three cases referred to are Gulf
Refining Co. v. Orr, 207 La. 915, 22 So.2d 269 (1945); McDonald v. Richard,
203 La. 155, 13 So.2d 712 (1943); Gailey v. McFarlain, 194 La. 150, 193 So.
570 (1940).
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relieve the land of the burden of the servitude; the landowner
is restored to full ownership.10 If the mineral interest is to be
transferred after prescription to a person other than the land-
owner, the transfer must be by act of the landowner.
Neither in the instant case nor in any of the previous cases
discussing the reversionary interest was the transferor of the
interest the landowner at the time when the servitude prescribed.
Disposing of such a problem in accordance with the rule of the
instant case would mean that a landowner might be allowed to
retain possession of valuable mineral rights after he purported
to transfer them by sale of a reversionary interest. In view
of the sweeping language used in the instant decision, it is an
open question whether the doctrine of after-acquired title will
be applied to a sale of mineral interests not owned by the vendor.
The doctrine was invoked in the past when the court found
a bona fide sale of mineral interests not designed to avoid the
running of prescription;" this seems appropriate even in light
of the instant decision.
William E. Crawford.
OBLIGATIONS-RECOVERY OF PROFITS LOST-CERTAINTY
OF PROOF
Plaintiff contractor sued defendant telegraph company to
recover profits lost as a result of defendant's failure to transmit
and deliver promptly a telegram filed by plaintiff to reduce the
amount of his previously submitted bid on a repair work con-
tract. The importance of the message was not made known to
defendant and delivery was delayed until after the bids were
opened. Plaintiff lost the contract to a competitor. The reduc-
tion would have placed his bid lower than that of his nearest
competitor, but his contract would have required a longer time
for completion. Held, plaintiff, even had he proved that his bid
would have been accepted, did not prove the amount of his
10. See Arts. 625, 425, LA. CrVIi CODE of 1870. See also note 8 supra.
11. White v. Hodges, 201 La. 1, 9 So.2d 433 (1942); cf. Arkansas Louisiana
Gas Co. v. Thompson, 222 La. 868, 64 So.2d 202 (1953); McDonald v. Richard,
203 La. 155, 13 So.2d 712 (1943); Lum Chow v. Board of Com'rs for Lafourche
B.L. Dist., 203 La. 268, 13 So.2d 857 (1943); Hodges v. Norton, 200 La. 614, 8
So.2d 618 (1942); St. Landry Oil & Gas Co. v. Neal, 166 La. 799, 118 So. 24
(1928). See the discussion of oversale in Bates v. Monzingo, 221 La. 479, 59
So.2d 693 (1952).
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